Definition
I begin by defining key terminology.
An ontological argument's nonempirical character distinguishes it from other theistic arguments. The principal goal of presenting or rehearsing an ontological argument is to promote the acquisition of inferential nonempirical knowledge that God exists, via acceptance of the conclusion based on competent deduction from the premises, which are themselves either nonempirically known or knowable. I will argue that, at least for beings like us, all ontological * This is a draft of a paper to appear in Ontological Proofs Today (Ontos Verlag), ed. Miroslaw Szatkowski. Comments welcome. Please don't cite, quote or refute without permission. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
arguments must fail to achieve this goal.
By God I mean the god of classical western religious monotheism: the unique, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent person who created and sustains the universe (Alston 1990: ch 1; Tooley 2009: section 1.1).
You inferentially know a proposition if and only if you know it based at least partly on inference from something else you accept. I use 'accept' broadly to include any kind of doxastic commitment, including belief, suspicion, faith, presupposition, etc. It is obvious that knowledge based on an argument is inferential.
You nonempirically know a proposition if and only if you know it in a way that is not even partly based on external perceptual experience. It is a harmless oversimplification to think of nonempirical knowledge in my sense as knowledge you could have, as they say, "from the armchair." You empirically know a proposition if and only if you know it based at least partly on external perceptual experience. It is possible to simultaneously know a proposition empirically and nonempirically, so long as you have sufficient independent bases for it.
An external perceptual experience is an experience produced by a power of the mind to receive signals from things other than itself (an "external channel").
1
Ordinary sensory experience counts as external perceptual experience. An external perceptual experience needn't have sensory content or any other sort of phenomenal or 1 I don't equate it with "exteroception" in the physiological sense, which pertains to detection of stimuli outside of the body. If the mind is identical to the body, then it would be equivalent to exteroception. 
Doom
Now I will present my main argument. The argument proceeds from three simple and intuitive premises. Remember that I am explicitly setting aside innate knowledge, so where I speak of knowing nonempirically, please understand me to mean knowing nonempirically and postnatally.
My first premise is that you cannot nonempirically know that another specific person exists now. You are the only specific person whom you can nonempirically know to exist now. You can know that other people exist now, of course, but you can know this only empirically. In order to know that others exist now, you must either (a) see them, hear them, touch them, smell them, or acquire some other sort of signal through an external channel, such as telepathy or clairvoyance, if such things are possible; or (b) remember things from previous external perceptual experiences, which somehow enables you to know that others presently exist. Such memories inherit their progenitors' empirical character.
I expect that this first premise is apt to seem uncontroversial, verging on the obvious. Even so, a vivid thought experiment can help us appreciate the point. Imagine that at some point in the near future, humanity plunges into a nuclear holocaust. Jade is buffeted by the blast, knocked unconscious in the otherwise empty and nondescript bomb shelter in her backyard. She suffers complete loss of declarative memory. Jade wakes up alone, numb and confused. It is completely dark, completely silent. She can see nothing, hear nothing, smell nothing, feel nothing, remember nothing. She wonders to herself, "Is there anyone else out there? Am I the only one?" It seems obvious that she can't know whether anyone else exists until she acquires some empirical evidence. She cannot, just by reflecting on her concepts and current mental condition, learn that she isn't alone, that other people currently exist.
Some philosophers have defended views about thought and language that might seem to threaten my first premise. Consider content externalism. Hilary Putnam asks, "Could we, if we were brains in a vat . . . think that we were? " (1981: 31) , and answers that we could not possibly do so. We couldn't think of vats unless we had a "causal connection to real vats" (1981: 37). And content externalism arguably generalizes to most or all of our concepts (Burge 1986 ). "Anyone who accepts [content] externalism knows that he cannot be systematically deceived about whether there are such things as cows, people, water, stars, and chewing gum" (Davidson 1990: 201) .
Of course, this isn't enough to help in Jade's case because she doesn't believe that others presently exist; she suspends judgment on that question. Moreover, due to her amnesia she lacks knowledge and beliefs about others. So she can't infer that most of her beliefs about others are true. Thought requires an "essential triangle" of thinker, environment and interpreter: "The presence of two or more creatures interacting with each other and with a common environment" is required for thinking to occur (Davidson 1990: 202- My second premise is that if any ontological argument can succeed for you, then you can nonempirically know that God, a person, exists now. For if it were to succeed, then you would nonempirically know that God exists. And it's trivially obvious that if God exists, then God exists eternally, including now; this is a simple conceptual truth, which you can and do know nonempirically. And it's trivially obvious that God is a person; this is a simple conceptual truth, which you also can and do know nonempirically.
My third premise is that you are not God. Disappointing as that may be, I trust that you will, at least upon cool reflection, agree that this premise needs no defense.  You can't innately know that God exists.
 You can't empirically know that God exists.
 You can't know by testimony that God exists.
 You can't know by revelation that God exists.
 You can't nonempirically know that any god whatsoever exists.
Regarding the last item, nothing in my argument speaks against nonempirical knowledge of impersonal gods. For example, perhaps we can know nonempirically that an infinite impersonal substance exists, and perhaps that counts as divine. That is consistent with everything I say here.
Second, I have neither utilized nor committed myself to any of the following general grounds for rejecting ontological arguments:
 Ontological arguments are invalid.
 Ontological arguments have a false premise.
 Ontological arguments are unsound.
 Ontological arguments suffer refutation by parody.
 Ontological arguments beg the question.
 Question-begging arguments must fail.
 Persuasiveness to opponents is a criterion of a successful argument.
 Persuasiveness to reasonable and neutral third parties is a criterion of a successful argument.
 Nonempirical knowledge would have to be infallible, indefeasible, or certain.
Finally, I have neither assumed nor committed myself to any of the following specific claims which feature centrally in some traditionally influential responses to the ontological argument:
 Existence is not a predicate.
 Existence is not a first-order predicate.
 Existence is not a perfection.
 The concept of God is inconsistent.
Conclusion
In closing, I would like to consider one final objection. Suppose that a proponent of the ontological argument rejects my premise that you are the only person whom you can nonempirically know to exist now. And suppose that this proponent offers the ontological argument itself as a counterexample to my premise. In that case, I am content to let the entire matter rest on the comparative plausibility of the two competing claims: on the one hand, that knowledge of other people's current existence requires empirical support, and on the other, that the ontological argument succeeds. I know which one seems more probable to me. Others will of course decide the matter for themselves.
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